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L INTRODUCTION 
At the conclusion of the Ninth Session of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the L·aw of the Sea (UNCLOS-111) on 
August 29, 1980, the chief American delegate, Ambassador Elliott 
L. Richardson, stated that it was "all but certain" that the text of 
a convention would be ready for signing in 1981. He added that, 
"historians looking back on this session of the conference are like-
ly to see it as the most significant single development of the rule 
of law since the founding of the United Nations itself."1 In its lead 
editorial of September 6, 1980, "Taming the Oceans With Law," 
The .New York Times expressed its full agreement that, if the 
final hurdles could be crossed, the prospective treaty "would 
signal a global victory for the rule of reason and the dominion of 
law."1 
In reading these and similar glowing accounts of the progress 
being made in UNCLOS-llI, this writer could not erase from his 
memory the warning sounded in 1967 in the following words by 
one of the world's leading authorities on the law of the sea, Pro· 
fessor Myres S. McDougal: "I think it may take a hundred years 
for the law of the sea to recover from the last two conferences 
which dealt with it, and I would regard the immediate call of 
another conference as an unmitigated disaster."8 
The purpose of this article is to analyze certain of the more 
critical aspects of the Draft Convention of September 22, 1980' in 
an effort to determine where the truth lies between these two 
sharply contrasting points of view. At the American Bar Associa-
tion National Institute on Marine Resources in June of 1967, Pro-
f essor McDougal pointed out that the international law of the sea, 
which to him was the most effective part of all the international 
•Member of the New York Bar an«t Member of the Board of Advisors of the Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce. 
1. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1980, at 4, col. 1. 
2. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1980, at 20, col. 1. 
3. THE LAW OF THE SEA 3 (L. Alexander ed. 1967). rhe reference to the last two con· 
ferences was to those of 1958 (UNCLOS-1) and 1960 (UNCLOS-11). 
4. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.10/REV.3, (22 Sept., 1980), reprinted in XIX INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 1129 et seq. (1980). 
1
Finlay: Proposed New Convention
Published by SURFACE, 1980
136 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:135 
law that the world enjoys today, had taken several centuries to 
evolve. He then summarized his views of the law of the sea as 
follows: 
It is . . . a simple system whereby with a few fundamental 
policies accepted in high degree by everybody we have been able 
to maintain to the inestimable benefit of the whole of mankind, 
an international and cooperative exploitation of the great shar-
able resources of the oceans. These simple policies have been 
that everybody has access and nobody can deny anybody else ac-
cess; that everybody makes and applies law to his own ships, his 
own craft; and that nobody makes and applies laws to the craft of 
other states except for violations of international law, or of na-
tional law as authorized by international law .... 
This inherited law of the sea is not a static thing. It is 
dynamic. There is a constitutional process that works with 
respect to it just as in any national community. This law is made 
and remade by custom - by people cooperating, working togeth-
er for common ends, clarifying their common interests as they 
engage in cooperative activity.5 
His objection to international conferences as a source of law was 
that 
[w]hen the representatives of the different peoples meet in 
these great conferences the officials come not only concerned to 
clarify common interests in the law of the sea, but also as repre-
sentatives of the total policies of their states .... In the light of 
experience, we might, thus, be forgiven a great reluctance to 
recommend anything other than reliance upon the habitual, 
customary processes in which impurities of claims of special in-
terest work themselves clean.8 
IL THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNCLOS-III CONVENTION 
What Professor McDougal feared is exactly what has come to 
pass. The 1958 conventions on the law of the sea, with all their 
shortcomings from Professor McDougal's point · of view, at least 
had the benefit of long and careful work by the International Law 
Commission, which had been charged by the General. Assembly of 
the United Nations with the codification of the customary inter-
5. McDougal, Revision of the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea-The 
Views of a Commentator, 1 NAT. RES. LAW. 19, 20, 21 (1968). 
6. Id. 
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national law on the subject. On this occasion, the International 
Law Commission was bypassed. The Group of 77 insisted, instead, 
that the matter be referred directly to a general international con-
ference on the ground that the developing countries had had little 
or no part in the formulation of the existing international law of 
the sea, that that law was the handmaiden of the former colonial 
powers, and that the developing countries wanted an across-the-
board reexamination of the subject with their particular needs and 
interests in mind. 7 
As a result of developments since the utterance of Professor 
McDougal's remarks in 1967, the negotations in UNCLOS-III may 
have become even more politicized than he anticipated. The ever-
growing number of developing countries in the United Nations 
have pressed, with increasing emphasis, for the management of 
international economic affairs on a one-country, one-vote basis. A 
major goal in this effort is the establishment of a New Inter-
national Economic Order under which the wealth of the world 
would be redistributed to their particular benefit. 8 
Of the present 154 member countries in the United Nations, 
120 or more are developing countries. As former colonies, depen-
dencies and trust territories become independent nations and join 
the United Nations, both the total number of developing countries 
in the United Nations and the size of their voting majority in the 
General Assembly steadily increase. Even a tiny island republic 
with a population of less than 100,000 and a minuscule GNP has 
the same voting power in that body as does th~ United States. 
This is in line with the recognition in the United Nations Charter 
of the principle of sovereign equality of states.9 The Charter also 
recognizes, however, that particular states are entitled to a 
special role based on the importance of the contributions that they 
are able to make to world affairs. It is for this reason that a 
7. An Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction created by G.A. RES. 2340 (XXII) (Dec. 18, 
1967) submitted its report in 1968; U.N. Doc. An230 (1968). It was followed by the Commit-
tee on Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction appointed by G.A. RES. 2467 A(XXIII) (Dec. 21, 1968) which submitted its final 
report in six volumes in 1973; U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973). UNCLOS-III was convened for its 
first organizational meeting in December, 1973 by G.A. RES. 3067 (XXVIII) (Nov. 16, 1973) 
and has thus far held eight subsequent sessions, the latest ones in two parts. 
8. See Bauer and Yamey, East-West/North-South-Peace and Prosperity?, COMMEN-
TARY, 57 et seq. (Sept. 1980). 
9. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 2.1, 10.1. 
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predominant role is assigned to the Security Council and a veto 
power over its actions on matters of substance is vested in each of 
its five permanent members.10 
If the United Nations were to be reconstituted on the basis of 
a one-country, one-vote determination of all matters within its 
competence, it would fly apart at the seams. Yet, the Group of 77 
has been undaunted in pressing this concept to the utmost in 
UNCLOS-111. UNCLOS-111 has, in fact, provided the arena for the 
Group of 77's most important campaign to date for the New Inter-
national Economic Order and, if a final text remotely approaching 
the Draft Convention in certain of its aspects ever enters into 
force, it will have won a signal victory. · 
On certain issues to be resolved in UNCLOS-111, particularly 
those relating to national security, the United States and other 
developed countries would not yield to any amount of pressure 
from the Group of 77. Freedom of transit and overflight of straits 
and archipelagic sea lanes used for international navigation was 
one of these issues. As a consequence, this freedom has been 
preserved11 despite the abandonment of the traditional three-
nautical mile territorial sea in favor of a twelve-nautical mile ter-
ritorial sea and the recognition of the concept of archipelagic 
waters encompassing, as internal waters, vast expanses of what 
has heretofore been regarded as high seas.12 
Similarly, coastal states are required under the Draft Conven-
tion to adhere to international standards with respect to the con-
struction, design, manning and equipment of foreign vessels mere-
ly exercising the right of innocent passage of their territorial 
seas.18 
The Group of 77 was also required to accept freedom of 
navigation and overflight and the freedom to lay submarine cables 
and pipelines in the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone as a 
condition to agreement that this zone is not a part of the high seas 
10. See Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMEN-
TARY AND DoCUMENTS 37 (1969). 
11. Note 3, supra, arts. 38, 53. This writer cautions the reader that, in arriving at his 
views regarding the acceptability of these articles, he was juding them exclusively from the 
standpoint of the needs of merchant shipping. For a strong view contra, primarily from the 
standpoint of military uses of the seas, see Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National 
Security: An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (1980). 
12. Note 3, supra, arts. 3, 49, 50. 
13. Id. art. 21.2. 
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but has a special status of its own.14 It may be noted in this connec-
tion that, though the developing countries took the lead in forcing 
acceptance of the exclusive economic zone, not all developed coun-
tries were opposed to it. For example, the coastal fishermen in the 
United States had been subjected to such increasing harassment 
at the hands of Soviet and other distant-water fishing fleets that 
they induced Congress and the President to anticipate the entry 
into force of this portion of the Draft Convention by enacting and 
signing into law the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 
1976.15 To the surprise of this writer,16 the acceptance of the in-
evitability of a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone as the 
wave of the future was so general that this unilateral action 
created hardly a ripple, despite the fact that it was in clear viola-
tion of our obligations under the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas.17 
As freedom of fishing beyond the limits of the territorial sea 
has been a high seas freedom ever since the time when Hugo 
Grotius's theory of mare liberum first gained the ascendency over 
John Selden's theory of mare clausum,18 UNCLOS-111 has had to 
devote much attention to such matters as the conservation of 
fisheries resources in the exclusive economic zone, maximum sus-
tainable yield and allowable catch, and the obligation of coastal 
states to make available to fishermen of other countries, and in 
what priorities, the portion of the allowable catch that is in excess 
of their own national fishing capabilities.19 The implementation of 
these provisions over the years can be expected to be a source of 
heated controversy in view of the historic rights that are being set 
aside. 
14. Id. arts. 58, 59, 86. It is to be noted that article 58 narrows the "other" freedoms of 
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas to "other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
related to" the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables 
and pipelines. (1962) 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 2. This contraction 
of present high seas freedoms might have serious adverse consequences with respect to 
matters not specifically guarded against in the Draft Convention. 
15. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976). 
16. See Finlay, United States Policy with Respect to High Seas Fisheries and Deep 
Seabed Minerals-A Study in. Contrasts, 9 NAT • .RESOURCES LAW. 629 (1976). 
17. Note 12, supra, art. 2(2). 
18. See SWARTZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 18-22 (1972). 
19. Note, supra arts. 61-63, 69-72. This portion of the Draft Convention also includes 
provisions regarding highly migratory species, art. 64, marine mammals, art. 65, and 
anadromous and catadromous species arts. 66 and 67. 
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After a fortunately abortive and short-lived proposal by the 
United States that coastal countries should renounce their 
sovereignty over seabed resources beyond the 2oo~meter isobath 
in exchange for a trusteeship for the international community 
over the balance of the margin, 20 broad-margin states, both 
developed and developing, have stood together on their retention 
of seabed-resource jurisdiction over their entire continental 
margins where they extend beyond the exclusive economic zone. 
They have gained recognition in the Draft Convention of the pro-
nouncement of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases that the natural prolongation of the land 
territory of a state into and under the sea is the juridical basis of 
such jurisdiction. 21 Article 76 codifies this concept and prescribes 
the so-called Irish formula, with specified limitations, for the 
precise delineation of the boundary of national jurisdiction where 
it extends more than 200-nautical miles from shore.22 In exchange 
for the clarification of the uncertain boundary of national jurisdic-
tion under the "adjacency" and "exploitability" tests of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf,23 the coastal states are re-
quired, however, to make a contribution for international com-
munity purposes with respect to production beyond the 200-
nautical mile limit. This contribution starts at one percent of value 
or volume of production beginning in the sixth year of production 
and rises to seven percent in the twelfth and subsequent years of 
production.24 
A reasonable compromise has been attained between the in-
terests of coastal countries in the protection of their environment 
and the interest of the community of nations as a whole in freedom 
of navigation.25 In the field of marine scientific research, the 
United States scientific community has not attained the degree of 
freedom that it sought on the continental shelf and in the ex-
20. See, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138.22 (1970); 9 INT'L LEGAL MATL'S 806 (1970). The drastic 
rise in oil prices following the 1973 war in the Middle East hastened the demise of this ill-
advised proposal. 
21. (1969) l.C.J. 3, 22; 8 INT'L. LEGAL MATL'S 340, 357 (1969). 
22. Note 3, supra art. 76.4(a) as qualified by arts. 76.5, 76.6. 
23. [1964) 1 U.S.T. 471, T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 1. 
24. Note 3, supra, art. 82. Under para. 3 of this article, a developing country that is 
net importer of the mineral resource involved is exempt from the obligation of this article 
with respect to that resource. 
25. Id. Part XII. 
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elusive economic zone. This is not surprising, however, in view of 
the precedent set, with United States concurrence, in the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Under that convention, the 
consent of the coastal state to research on its continental shelf 
must be obtained but may not unreasonably be withheld.26 This is 
basically what is prescribed in the Draft Convention for both the 
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone but in con-
siderably greater detail.27 
The three areas in which the developing countries have gained 
the greatest concessions from the developed countries are the 
provisions for the settlement of disputes, provisions relating to ac-
tivities in the international seabed area (the Area), and provisions 
relating to amendments to the portions of the Convention dealing 
with activities in the Area. 
Special provisions are made for the settlement of disputes in 
the Area, as will be discussed shortly. For other disputes, with the 
exception of the limited categories excluded from compulsory 
settlement,28 states parties to the Convention are given a choice 
between a new International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (the 
Tribunal), the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Annex VII and, for special 
categories of disputes, a special arbitral tribunal constituted in ac-
cordance with Annex VIIl.29 In the absence of agreement of both 
parties to a dispute on the same method of settlement, the provi-
sions for arbitration under Annex VII will govern.30 
The Tribunal is composed of twenty-one, judges and has a Sea-
Bed Disputes Chamber of eleven members elected by the twenty-
one from among their own number.81 With three exceptions, the 
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has exclusive jurisdiction over all 
disputes with respect to activities in the Area.82 Two of the excep-
tions are helpful ones that provide for arbitration under the rules 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law of 
disputes between a contractor and the International Sea-Bed 
26. Note 21, supra art. 5.1, 5.8. 
27. Note 3, supra Part XIII. 
28. See id. arts. 297, 298. 
29. Id. art. 287. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. Annex VI, arts. 2, 36.1. 
32. Id. art. 187. 
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Authority38 (the Authority) and disputes between a prospective 
contractor and the Authority regarding the extent of his obliga-
tion to provide technology to the Enterprise or to developing 
countries.a. Only the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, however, has 
jurisdiction to interpret the meaning or application of Part XI of 
the Draft Convention and the related annexes dealing with ac-
tivities in the Area. If such a question exists at the outset of, or 
arises during, an arbitration proceeding, it must ·be submitted to 
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, and its decision is binding on the 
arbitration tribunal in arriving at its own decision. 36 
The third exception is a highly undesirable one which ex-
cludes from the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber the 
power to find either that the rules, regulations and procedures 
adopted by the Authority are not in conformity with the provi-
sions of the Convention or that they are invalid.88 If this is not 
clarified, the Authority can become a law unto itself. 
The provisions for the election of members of the Tribunal 
and its Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber are such as to assure a heavy 
preponderance of natio:pals of the developing countries. The 
Western European and Other Group in the United Nations and the 
Eastern European (Soviet) group are assured of no more than 
three members each and neither group may realistically expect to 
have more than four members.87 This means that thirteen to fif-
teen members will be from the developing countries. A com-
parable composition of the eleven members of the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber must be anticipated. 
It is common knowledge in our own country that judges bring 
their personal philosophies with them to the bench. It is hardly 
conceivable that the developing country nationals constituting a 
substantial majority on the Tribunal would ever have been 
nominated if they did not share their respective national 
philosophies on the New International Economic Order. It is only 
natural, therefore, that the market-oriented countries of the West 
and their nationals would have little confidence in the impartiality 
of a tribunal so constituted. 
33. Id. art. 188.2. 
34. Id. Annex III, art. 5.4. 
35. Id. art. 188.2(b). 
36. Id. art. 190. 
37. Id. arts. 2-4. 
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The same objection applies to · the designation of the Presi-
dent of the Tribunal, who may be expected to be a developing-
country national, as the official to select the neutral arbitrators in 
arbitration proceedings under Annex VII of the Draft Convention 
when the parties to the dispute cannot themselves agree on the 
seleetion.88 As a consequence, the option given parties to the Con-
vention to select arbitration tribunals as the only means of set-
tling disputes other than those relating to activities in the Area to 
which they are a party does not give them the assured impartiali-
ty of adjudication that Ambassador Richardson and the editor of 
The New York Times seem to assume. This is further supported 
in that even an impartially selected arbitration tribunal, as a one-
time body, would have every inclination to follow the lead of the 
Tribunal on any issue on which it had already ruled in another case 
unless its ruling was so outrageous as to destroy its credibility. 
The fact that an arbitration tribunal under Annex VII can 
deal with the most critical issues of interpretation and application 
of all parts of the Convention except Part XI and related annexes 
dealing with activities in the Area, whereas even the most trivial 
question of interpretation or application of Part XI and the related 
annexes must be submitted to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, is 
one of many indications of the degree to which activities in the 
Area have been accepted in UNCLOS-III as the special domain of 
the· developing countries. It is with respect to these activities that 
the Group of 77 has exacted the greatest concessions from the 
developed countries, with Canada, the principal producer of 
nickel, as their active collaborator in the demand for protection of 
land-based production of the minerals to be found in the Area. 
Part XI and Annexes III and IV of the Draft Convention pro-
vide a comprehensive regime for the development, under the con-
trol of the Authority, of the mineral resources of the Area. The 
principal organs of the Authority are an Assembly, a Council and 
a Secretariat. There are also an Enterprise, through which the 
Authority itself will engage in exploration and exploitation of the 
resources of the Area in competition with those it regulates, an 
Economic Planning Commission and a Legal and Technical Com-
mission, together with provisions for such other subordinate 
organs as may be needed. The Assembly, made up of all the state 
38. Id. Annex VII, art.3(e). 
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parties and organized on a one-country, one-vote basis, continues 
to be designated as the "supreme organ" of the Authority,39 a 
designation that may some day serve to unravel some of the 
safeguards that the U.S. Delegation has sought to write into Part 
XI. 
The Council, made up of thirty-six members, is designated as 
the executive organ of the Authority. Its members are to be 
selected on the basis of (a) investments in preparation for and con-
duct of activities in the Area (four members), (b) importation or 
consumption of commodities produced from the categories of 
minerals to be derived from the Area (four members), (c) exporta-
tion of land-based production of such minerals (four members), (d) 
special interests such as countries of large populations, those 
which are land-locked or geographically disadvantaged, those 
which are major importers or potential producers of the minerals 
in question and those which are the least developed (six members), 
and (e) equitable geographic distribution of seats, with no more 
than a single seat to a country (eighteen members).40 
To prevent the developed countries and their nationals from 
being at the mercy of developing-country majorities in both the 
Assembly and the Council, many compromise provisions have 
been worked out after long and persistent effort. Some of them 
give the Council, not the Assembly, the final say on such matters 
as the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.41 
Another provision prescribes voting rules for the Council under 
which the majority required for the Council to act varies with the 
importance of the matter to be acted upon and ranges from the re-
quirement of a simple majority on procedural matters to the re-
quirement of a consensus on the most delicate matters such as 
adoption or revision of the rules, regulations and procedures of 
the Authority and amendment of the provisions of the Convention 
relating to activities in the Area.42 As a further safeguard, the 
U.S. Delegation has proposed that interim rules, regulations and 
procedures drafted by a Preparatory Commission be effective on a 
provisional basis until adopted or modified by the Council by con-
sensus and that the United States not ratify the Convention until 
39. Id. arts. 159, 160.1. 
40. Id. art. 161.1. 
41. Id. art. 162.2(n)(ii). 
42. Id. art. 161.7. 
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it has had the opportunity to review the report of the Preparatory 
Commission. '3 
A cardinal flaw in this elaborately designed mechanism for 
the attainment of a balancing of interests is that, after a relatively 
brief period of years, the mechanism may be discarded by the 
developing countries and revised to suit their tastes. This is the 
effect of Article 155 which calls for a review conference to be con-
vened fifteen years after the first of January of the year in which 
commerical production in the Area under the terms of the Conven-
tion commences. The conferees have sweeping powers to modify 
Part XI and the related annexes by amendments that will be bind-
ing on all states parties if approved and ratified by three-fourths 
of them during the first five years of the conference, or by two-
thirds of them during the sixth year." As this is a vote that the 
developing countries can easily muster, this means, in effect, that 
after a brief transitional period of about twenty years, the 
development of the mineral resources of the Area will be sur-
rendered to world government under developing country control. 
The only answer that the U.S. Delegation has offered to this alar-
ming prospect is that, if the review conference acts in an extreme 
manner, the United States could denounce the Convention.45 
Denunciation would have to be of the Convention as a whole and 
not of Part XI alone. It seems self-evident that the availability of 
the right of denunciation, with all the consequences which that ac-
tion would entail, is a grossly inadequate substitute for acceptable 
treaty provisions of a durable nature. 
Even during the interim period, access of American contrac-
tors to the Area would be severely limited. Until the conclusion of 
the deliberations of the review conference, production controls 
geared to world demand for nickel are imposed by Article 151.2 
for the protection of the countries producing the key minerals to 
43. Seabed Mining and Law of the Sea, Current Policy No. 233, U.S. State Depart-
ment, Sept. 24, 1980 at 2. 
44. Note 3 supra arts. 155.4, 316.5. 
45. This is the implication of the U.S. Delegation Reports of the Feb. 27-April 4, 1980 
and July 28-Aug. 29, 1980 meetings of the Ninth Session of UNCLOS-111, at 10 and 6, respec-
tively. The U.S. Delegation views the provision for binding revisions of Part XI by the ma-
jority vote prescribed in articles 155.4 and 316.5 as an improvement over the earlier provi-
sion for a moratorium on contracts if the review conference failed to reach agreement. It 
also seems content with the current text, as revised, to harmonize the time lag for entry in-
to effect of amendments approved at the review conference with the time lag for the effec-
tiveness of a denunciation of the Convention under article 3217. 
11
Finlay: Proposed New Convention
Published by SURFACE, 1980
146 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:135 
be found in polymetallic nodules: manganese, nickel, copper and 
cobalt.46 The conferees in UNCLOS-111 have blithely assumed that 
land-based production of these minerals will always be in adequate 
supply at reasonable prices and have provided no safeguards 
against the contrary, notwithstanding the dramatic increase that 
took place in the price of cobalt, for example, when a single mine 
in Zaire was seized by Katanganese irregulars in 1978.'7 
As a safeguard against adverse majority action in the Coun-
cil, the Draft Convention calls for virtually automatic issuance of 
contracts to qualified applicants provided only that the Legal and 
Technical Commission discharges its responsibilities in an objec-
tive manner.48 During the years that a production ceiling is in ef-
fect-and there is no assurance under Article 151.2 that this will 
not be forever despite the fact that it is described as being for an 
"interim period" -a contractor must, however, also have a produc-
tion authorization; this requires a three-fourths majority vote of 
the Council.'9 Based on the Bureau of Mines' mid-range projection 
of 3.4% per annum growth in nickel demand for the balance of the 
century, only five production authorizations of from 38,000 to 
46,500 tons of nickel per annum (for a maximum total of 200,000 
tons) could be issued through the year 1988, and only three addi-
tional authorizations averaging 40,000 tons per annum each could 
46. Secretary of State Kissinger agreed in the spring of 1976 to production controls 
for the protection of land-based producers for a temporary period and to the Authority's 
representation of "the amount of production for which it is directly responsible" in the 
negotiation of international commodity agreements, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
of State, PR 162, Apr. 8, 1976 at 7. Article 151.2(a) of the Draft Convention is so worded as 
to guard against any lapse in the "temporary" production controls should the review con-
ference convened under article 155 decide to continue them. Article 151.1 is so worded that 
the Authority will represent not only the production in the Area for which it is "directly" 
responsible, but also in all production in the Area during the negotiation of international 
commodity agreements. 
47. According to the William G. Shepherd, Jr. column, Investing, in the Financial Sec-
tion of the New York Times, Nov. 2, 1980, the price of cobalt escalated from $6.40 per pound 
to $45 per pound, receding only to around $25 per pound after the invaders were driven off. 
This effectively demonstrates that the post-1973 OPEC experience is not necessarily unique 
to oil. 
48. Note supra 3, art. 162.2(j). If the Legal and Technical Commission, which is charg-
ed with making recommendations to the Council, recommends approval of the plan of work 
and issuance of a contract, it requires a consensus decision of the Council to overrule this 
recommendation, with the state party or parties making or sponsoring the application not 
participating in the decision. If the Legal and Technical Commission fails to recommend ap-
proval, however, it requires a three-fourths majority vote of the Council to approve it. 
49. Id. arts. 162.2(p), 161.7(c). 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1980], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol7/iss2/2
1979-80] Proposed New Convention 147 
be issued during the ensuing three years.50 Under the provisions 
of Article 7 .6 of Annex III, the Enterprise would have priority for 
at least one-half the available quota for itself and those par-
ticipating in joint ventures with it.51 Under Article 7.5 of the same 
annex there would be no reasonable prospect of more than one 
American contractor obtaining a production authorization as long 
as there were competing applications for production authoriza-
tions from countries of which no national had yet received an 
authorization. 
Ambassador Richardson has expressed the view that, "[N]ot-
withstanding the share of production taken up by the Enterprise, 
acting alone or in joint ventures, there would still be sufficient 
tonnage under any reasonable set of assumptions to insure that 
private miners would get their authorizations when they need 
them."52 This writer has difficulty understanding how this can be 
true unless one of the assumptions is that the attractiveness of the 
final terms prescribed in the Convention for contracts in the Area 
will be so marginal that there will be a dearth of applicants willing 
to take the chance during the early years of the interim period. 
What is in prospect under the Draft Convention is a far cry 
from the freedom of access for all that Professor McDougal 
described as the essential spirit of current international law and 
that he felt was attainable, even as regards polymetallic nodules, 
without the need of an elaborate treaty regime. As he put it in 
1967: 
We already have an internationalized system for development of 
the resources of the oceans, this flagship system. If we add the 
rich experience whereby the continents of the world were 
allocated among territorial communities by policies emphasizing 
notice of claim, effective occupation, actual use and enjoyment 
(policies entirely parallel to those by which mineral resources 
have been allocated within our national communities), I believe 
that we could have an internationalized system that would bring 
the utmost capital to bear upon this exploitation as it becomes 
technologically and commercially feasible. Such an interna-
50. Note 40, supra, at 3. 
51. Though the Enterprise will be provided with financing only for a single project 
under art. 11.3 of Annex IV, the availability of special financial inducements under arts. 11 
and 13 of Annex III for those participating in joint ventures with it might well induce them 
to provide the entire startup capital for the joint ventures. 
52. Note 40, supra, at 3. 
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tionalization would not freeze any kind of monopoly, such as divi-
sion among coastal states or control by some intergovernmental 
organization might entail, and would appear most compatible 
with the basic policies of greatest aggregate production and 
widest distribution. . . . If this kind of internationalization 
worked-and if exploitation does become feasible in high 
degree-then perhaps some of the riches obtained could be tax-
ed by the United Nations or some of the profits could be 
allocated to support international government and development, 
or for other purposes. 53 
Professor McDougal's views in this regard have found sup-
port in the writings of Professor L.F .E. Goldie in which he has 
pointed out, inter alia, the comparability of mining the poly-
metallic nodules of the international seabed area to that of mining 
the coal of Spitzbergen at a time when it was not subject to any 
claim of national sovereigtny.54 
What is in prospect under the Draft Convention is also a far 
cry from the guaranty of continuing access to deep seabed 
minerals by U.S. pioneer investors that Title II of the Deep Sea-
bed Hard Mineral Resources Act would seem to call for. 55 
It is worthy of note that, due to its preoccupation with poly-
metallic nodules, UNCLOS-111 has come up with a text that would 
seem to preclude development of hydrocarbons or other non-
nodule minerals in the Area. This results from the combination of 
Article 137, which prevents the development of any category of 
minerals in the Area except pursuant to the terms of the Conven-
tion, and the total absence of financial provisions for any category 
of minerals other than polymetallic nodules.56 Article 151.3 
recognizes that the production controls prescribed in Article 151.2 
are applicable only to nodules and authorizes the Authority to 
limit the production of non-nodule minerals in such manner as may 
be appropriate. There is, however, no comparable provision with 
respect to any other matter; this is a critical flaw that requires 
correction. Only the Enterprise, which needs no contract, would 
53. Note 4, supra at 27. 
54. Goldie, A General International Law Doctrine for Seabead Regimes, 7 INT'L LAW. 
796 (1973); Goldie, Mining Rights and the General International Law Regime of the Deep 
Ocean Floor, II BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Goldie, Customary International Law and 
Deep Seabed Mining, 6 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 173 (1978). 
55. Pub. L. No. 96-283 (1980). 
56. Article 13 of Annex III deals exclusively with polymetallic nodules and is not 
adaptable to any other category of minerals. 
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seem to be free to proceed with the development of non-nodule 
minerals of the Area. 57 
There was a persistent drive on the part of a number of 
developing countries during the early sessions of UNCLOS-111 to 
vest in the Authority a monopoly of production in the Area. In an 
effort to break the deadlock on this and other points, Secretary of 
State Kissinger in 1975 and 1976 agreed that, in exchange for 
meaningful, nondiscriminatory access for states and their na-
tionals to deep-seabed resources, the United States would, inter 
alia, (a) accept a system under which each individual contractor 
would propose two mine sites, of which the Authority would select 
one for itself or in its discretion for developing countries, and the 
other of which would be assigned to the contractor; (b) make a ma-
jor effort to provide training opportunities and advanced 
technology to the Authority and the developing countries; and (c) 
agree to a means of financing the Enterprise.58 
The subsequent negotiations have led to a text under which 
an American contractor would have to fend for himself in today's 
difficult capital market while the Enterprise would receive from 
the United States and other states capital of approximately $1 
billion required for its first project. The United States' share of 
this total would be approximately $250 billion, one half in the form 
of long-term, interest-free loans and one half in the form of loan 
guarantees.59 
Under the parallel system, the American contractor would 
not only have to bear the cost of prospecting his own contract area 
but also the cost of prospecting the reserved area to be exploited 
by the Enterprise acting alone or in association with others.60 The 
added cost to the contractor of this obligation, and the reciprocal 
benefit to the Enterprise and those acting in association with it, 
are estimated at from $5 to $10 million. 
The financial charges which the contractor must pay, but 
from which the Enterprise is exempt for up to 10 years after com-
57. Note 3, supra, Annex Ill, art. 3.5. Article 10 of Annex IV eventually obligates the 
Enterprise to make financial payments comparable to those required of contractors under 
article 13 of Annex Ill, but it is given a grace period of up to ten years from its commence-
ment of production as determined by the Assembly. 
58. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, P.R. 
408(75) (Aug. 11, 1975), 162 (76) (April 18, 1976), P.R. USUN-99(76) (Sept. 2, 1976). 
59. Note 3, supra, Annex IV, art. 11.3. 
60. Id. Annex IV, art. 8. 
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mencement of commercial production,61 are (a) the cost of process-
ing his application, initially estimated at $500,000 but subject to 
change in the light of experience; and (b) an annual fixed fee of $1 
million up to the commencement of commercial production.62 There-
after, the contractor must pay the greater of $1 million per annum 
or a financial contribution that, at the contractor's option, may 
either be a production charge alone (ranging up to 12% of the 
market value of the processed metals produced from the nodules 
extracted from the contract area) or a combination of a lesser pro-
duction charge (ranging up to 4% of the market value of the pro-
cessed metals) and a share (ranging up to 70%) of the contractor's 
net proceeds attributable to his mining operations in the contract 
area. Factors such as whether commercial production has con-
tinued for more or less than ten years and the profitability of the 
mining operation are used in determining the exact percentages to 
be applied up to the indicated maximums.63 
The contractor must also provide training opportunities for 
the personnel of the Enterprise and developing countries in all 
phases of the operations covered by his contract.64 If the Enter-
prise finds that it cannot obtain the technology to be used by the 
contractor or equally efficient technology in the open market on 
fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, the contrac-
tor must offer his own technology to the Enterprise on fair and 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions. If the technology 
belongs to an independent licensor, the contractor may not use it 
unless the licensor is willing to offer a written assurance to the 
Enterprise to the same effect. In certain circumstances, these re-
quirements extend to the benefit of developing countries or 
groups of developing countries that have applied for a contract for 
the reserved site tendered by the contractor. 65 The traditional 
right of an inventor to reserve unto himself the fruits of his inven-
tion would become a thing of the past as far as activities in the 
Area are concerned. 
A contractor preferring to go it alone must forfeit the finan-
cial incentives that are offered to those participating in joint ven-
61. Id. Annex III, ·art. 10.3. 
62. Id. Annex III, art. 13.2. 
63. Id. Annex III, art. 13.3 et seq. 
64. Id. Annex III, art. 15. 
65. Id. Annex III, art. 5-
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tures with the Enterprise.118 The participants in UNCLOS-III have 
reflected their concern for the competitive status of land-based 
miners by prescribing that these incentives and those that may be 
provided through revision of a contract under Article 19 of Annex 
III in eases of hardship may not result in subsidizing contractors 
with a view to placing them at an artificially competitive advan-
tage relative to land-based miners.67 No concern whatever is 
reflected, however, for the competitive status of the contractor 
who elects to go it alone in the development of the resources of the 
Area. 
The outlook for such a contractor is in sorry contrast to the 
right of unimpeded access to the resources of the Area. Such ac-
cess would be accompanied by security of tenure under reasonable 
terms and conditions designed to assure the development of 
resources of the Area for the benefit of consumers throughout the 
world put forward as the negotiating objective of the United 
States in UNCLOS-III. The crowning blow would come if the con-
tractor were denied a production authorization because of lack of 
quota at the time that the priority provisions of Article 7.6 of An-
nex III were applied to give the Enterprise or one or more 
developing countries acting under Article 9.4 of that annex a pro-
duction authorization for the reserved area stemming from the 
contractor's own application.68 
/IL CON CL US/ON 
This is the startling extent to which the traditional concept of 
freedom of the seas in the international seabed area and the con-
comitant encouragement that its preservation would give to the 
development of the resources of the Area for the benefit of the 
world community as a whole have been suppressed. Certainly, 
there are better methods of providing economic assistance to the 
developing countries than that devised in UNCLOS-III. The ag-
gregate of the benefits for the Enterprise and those operating in 
association with it is such that, with a modicum of efficiency on 
their part, they might well be able to obtain de facto the monopoly 
66. Id. Annex III, arts. 11.2, 13.l(d), 13.14. 
67. Id., Annex III, art. 13.l(f). 
68. A reserved area becomes such under article 8 of Annex III upon approval of the 
contractor's plan of work and the signing of his contract and is not dependent upon the is-
suance of a production authorization. Therefore, article 7.6 applies. 
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of production in the Area that the Group of 77 long sought de jure. 
This writer can only conclude that Professor McDougal was in 
much closer touch with the realities of the world than are Am-
bassador Richardson and the editor The New York Times. 
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